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Abstract—Anomaly detection is generally acknowledged as an
important problem that has already drawn attention to various
domains and research areas, such as, network security. For
such “classic” application domains a wide range of surveys and
literature reviews exist already – which is not the case for the
process domain. Hence, this systematic literature review strives to
provide an organized holistic view on research related to business
process runtime behavior anomaly detection. For this the unique
challenges of the process domain are outlined along with the
nature of the analyzed data and data sources. Moreover, existing
work is identified and categorized based on the underlying
fundamental technology applied by each work. Furthermore, this
work describes advantages and disadvantages of each identified
approach. Based on these information limitations and gaps in ex-
isting research are identified and recommendations are proposed
to tackle them. This work aims to foster the understanding and
development of the process anomaly detection domain.
I. INTRODUCTION
Business processes integrate a wide range of data sources,
applications, IT systems, and manage public but also con-
fidential private information, cf. [1]. In addition, processes
tend to be executed in flexible diverse infrastructures and
interconnected environments where they fulfill viable roles and
enable critical business operations. Hence, processes cannot
only be beneficial for an organization but also for attackers
that can exploit them, for example, to spread attacks over
multiple IT systems and partners, cf. [2], [3]. Moreover,
processes are not only applied in human driven scenarios
but also in automatic execution environments – which are
especially security critical. This is because automatic process
executions are less strictly controlled and monitored by hu-
mans. Hence, attackers can explore potential attack vectors fast
and automatically, likely, without ever being noticed, cf. [4].
These aspects show that processes are not only important but
also a security critical aspect in today’s organizations. Hence,
applying security measures is a necessity to prevent security
incidents which range from targeted or random outside attacks
over malicious insiders to fraud that can harm an organization.
Furthermore organizations are also required by law to
take measures which foster secure process executions. For
example upcoming EU regulations, such as, the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) enforce significant fines for
security incidents, i.e., up to e20 million or 4% of the at-
tacked organization’s global annual turnover for the preceding
financial year, cf. [5]. The GDPR is not the only regulation that
encourages process based organizations to implement security
measures. Another example is the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) which was enacted in 1996.
It establishes a U.S. wide standard for electronic health care
data transmissions, storage, and processing. It states, for
example, in §1173(d)(2)(AB) that each entity needs to ensure
(A) the integrity and confidentiality of private data; (B) to
protect private data against reasonable anticipated threats or
hazards to the security or integrity of the information; and
(C) unauthorized uses or disclosure of information. This law
applies to each entity that handles health care information,
i.e., a wide range of entities is affected from hospitals, over
specialists, to medical laboratories. Similar regulations – with
even broader implications – can be found in many areas, such
as, the 44 U.S. Code §3542 (2012), to give only one additional
example. Hence, we assume that the monitoring and control
of process executions is a necessity and security measures are
a key concern in the process domain [6].
Existing work applies business process anomaly detection
to analyze the runtime behavior of business processes to
detect and prevent attacks and security incidents, cf. [7], [8].
Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the existing
process anomaly detection approaches – that are capable of
detecting security incidents (i.e., process runtime anomalies)
– are limited in regard to their support for upcoming chal-
lenges and attack vectors. These are, for example, attacks that
combine multiple process instances to harden their detection.
To verify this assumption this work investigates the state
of the art in process runtime anomaly detection. By doing so
it provides an overview on current process focused anomaly
detection approaches, methods, and techniques – along with
their advantages and limitations. Hereby it is shown that a
wide range of approaches already exists but that, nevertheless,
several open research gaps and questions still remain unan-
swered. In addition similar literature reviews are commonly
available for anomaly detection work in non-process focused
domains, e.g., [9]. However, these do not cover process
anomaly detection publications and approaches. This probably
hinders the development and research in the process anomaly
detection domain because, for example, a guidance towards
uncovered gaps or open questions is currently missing. Hence,
we assume the given systematic literature review as necessary.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the
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research methodology for the conducted systematic literature
review, starting with research challenges, literature search,
and search term definition. The knowledge gained during this
section is utilized in Section III which reports on aspects
related to process anomaly detection (e.g., the nature of the
analyzed data) and challenges that harden anomaly detection
in the process domain. Furthermore, Section IV presents the
identified anomaly detection approaches/publications – includ-
ing their techniques, advantages, and disadvantages – and
reveals research gaps. Limitations and gaps identified during
the conducted literature analysis are outlined and discussed
– in detail – in Section V. Finally, Section VI discusses the
limitations of this work and Section VII concludes it.
II. METHODOLOGY
In the following sections a systematic literature review is
performed [10], [11]. To foster the soundness of the review
results we follow broadly acknowledged research guidelines
for systematic reviews, cf. [10]. Accordingly we start by
outlining the methodology of this review, cf. Fig. 1. Initially,
a preliminarily search for existing business process anomaly
detection work was conducted. Because none was found
research questions were formulated. Subsequently, a literature
search and selection was conducted in major public research
databases based on chosen broad search keywords. Identified
relevant literature was analyzed, classified, and presented.
Finally, research gaps and limitations were determined.
This work focuses on evaluating the anomaly detection
attempts in the business process domain based on the following
research questions:
RQ1 What are anomalies and how are they defined in the pro-
cess domain (common understanding and terminology)?
RQ2 Which anomaly detection approaches are currently ap-
plied in the business process domain?
RQ3 Which challenges and requirements remain unanswered
by existing process anomaly detection research?
Each questions focuses on a different aspect which this
systematic review is interested in. The first question (RQ1)
enables to provide a general understanding of the business
process anomaly detection domain (e.g., its intentions, char-
acteristics, and goals). This requires to identify relevant work
based on search keywords. To reduce the odds that some
work is overlooked we opted to choose broad keywords which
were combined based on boolean AND/OR operators. So
during the conduced literature search the related work has to
contain “workflow” or “business process” along with the term
“anomaly detection” in its title, keywords, or abstract.
The second question (RQ2) focuses on determining which
anomaly detection approaches are currently applied. In addi-
tion their advantages and disadvantages are identified along
with our impression on the evaluation quality of the analyzed
work (e.g., if the existing work is evaluated with real world
data or with synthetic data). This also enabled us to determine
the applied foundational anomaly detection technology (e.g.,
process mining or statistical techniques) which is, in the
following, exploited to classify/organize the identified work.
Finally, all the findings are condensed and analyzed as a
whole to identify novel research questions, limitations, and
gaps (RQ3). Through this future research is guided.
The conducted literature search mainly focused on public
research databases and libraries. Horizontal searches were
conduced with Google Scholar (https://scholar.google.com/)
and DBPL (http://dblp.uni-trier.de/). Furthermore, selected
publisher databases were searched, i.e., IEEE Xplore (http:
//ieeexplore.ieee.org/), ACM Digital Library (http://dl.acm.
org/), and ISI Web Of Science (https://apps.webofknowledge.
com) – ISI also includes the Springer database. In total thou-
sands of potential papers were identified in the chosen research
databases. This isn’t surprising as the keywords utilized during
the search were broadly defined. Hence, an extensive literature
selection and review process was conduced. Hereby, the title,
abstract, and keywords were analyzed in a first step. This
already enables to broadly classify the identified work as
potentially relevant or not. Finally, the potentially relevant
publications were closely examined to determine if its contents
focuses on business process anomaly detection. If this is the
case then the work was classified as relevant and included in
this review. Finally, backward and forward snowballing was
applied on the papers identified during the research database
search. Overall 35 process runtime behavior anomaly detection
papers, which are all listed in this paper’s references, were
identified as relevant and selected for the following analysis.
Be aware that in case of duplicate publications (i.e., a
conference paper that was later extended into a journal article)
the journal article was preferred. This is because we assume
that journal articles provide more detailed and complete in-
formation when comparing them to proceeding papers. In
addition we limited our search to papers that were published
until (including) 2016 to foster the reproducibility of this work.
This is because throughout this systematic literature review the
year 2017 was not yet over so that all relevant papers of 2017
were, likely, not yet released. Hence, future reproductions of
this work would likely not yield the same search results –
which is taken into account by the applied approach.
A. Publication time frame and sources
The identified literature was published between 2005 and
2016. A detailed overview on the publication time frame is
provided in Fig. 2. During the early years, i.e., 2005 to 2009 a
limited but nevertheless measurable increase in the publication
numbers can be observed. Subsequently, between 2010 and
2014 the number of publications in each year is relatively
stable, wavering between 2 to 3 for each year. Finally, a
significant increase in publication numbers was observed for
the years 2015 and 2016, i.e., between 5 (2015) to 10 (2016)
related publications, identified by our search, were published
in each of this two years. This findings indicate that the
scientific community has an increasing interest in the business
process runtime behavior anomaly detection domain.
In addition Table I provides an overview on the most im-
portant publication sources. This are conferences and journals
that more than one of the identified business process runtime
Fig. 1. Outline of the applied research methodology.
Fig. 2. Number of publications on business process runtime anomaly detection published from 2005 to 2016.
anomaly detection publications were published in. Overall it
was found that the publication sources are wide spread as the
identified work was found to be published in more then 28
different sources. In addition, we were left with the impression
that conferences are the preferred publication method for the
identified work as almost twice as much of the identified
publications were published in conferences than in journals.
Finally, the most significant publication source was found to
be the Business Process Management (BPM) conference as a
total of three publications were published in BPM proceedings.
III. ASPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF BUSINESS PROCESS
RUNTIME BEHAVIOR ANOMALY DETECTION
This section discusses different aspects and challenges of
business process behavior anomaly detection – in particular –
and the business process modeling domain in general. This is
necessary as existing anomaly detection work concentrates and
specializes on various, partly diametrical, challenges, targets,
and characteristic, such as, the tackled anomaly types, the
nature of the analyzed data, or domain characteristics. This
shows the diversity and complexity of the domain, challenges,
and requirements – which motivates not only this systematic
literature review but also the application of different anomaly
detection techniques and approaches.
An anomaly, in its abstracted definition, is some kind of
behavior that does not conform to expected behavior, cf.
[9]. Hence, anomaly detection approaches typically define
the normal/expected behavior based on given (training) data.
Any observed behavior that does not match to the expected
behavior is assumed as anomalous. While this seems to be
straightforward, several aspects make this task challenging.
For example, defining normal behavior is hard, especially if
the border between normal and anomalous behavior is only
vaguely defined, cf. [12]. In addition attackers can adapt
themselves to appear normal. Moreover, the analyzed data
can contain noise or errors that are hard to distinguish from
anomalies (e.g., caused by evolving process definitions) [13].
Finally, anomalies can be defined differently, depending on
the application scenario and the intentions of the surrounding
environment – as outlined in the following.
1) General Anomaly Types: Typically existing anomaly
detection approaches only focus on detecting specific anomaly
types. Being aware of the anomaly types that can be identified
by a detection approach enables to better understand and assess
its capabilities and limitations – which motivated the following
outline. Generally anomalies are classified into three groups,
cf. [12], i.e., point, contextual, and collective anomalies. In the
following each group will be discussed, starting with point
anomalies which most existing process anomaly detection
work was found to be focusing on.
Point anomalies: Such an anomaly occurs if an individual
data instance (e.g., an individual activity execution) is con-
sidered as anomalous with respect to the rest of the analyzed
data (e.g., all known executions of a specific activity), cf. [9].
We assume this as the simplest form of the three described
anomaly types as identifying it does not require to correlate
multiple data instances (e.g., multiple activity executions). A
brief example for such an anomaly can be found in typical
payment transaction processes. In such a scenario an anomaly
detection approach could simply monitor the amount data flow
variable and if it exceeds a specific threshold then the current
process instance is identified with a point anomaly.
Contextual anomalies: This kind of anomaly is sometimes
also referred to as conditional anomaly, cf. [9]. It occurs if
an anomalous data instance is only anomalous in a specific
context. So, while business process behavior can be anomalous
in a specific context the same behavior would not be identified
as anomalous in a different context. Business processes hold
Title Type No.
Business Process Management (BPM) Conference 3
Enterprise, Business-Process and Information Systems Modeling (BPMDS) Conference 2
Symposium On Applied Computing (SAC) Conference 2
Information Systems Journal (ISJ) Journal 2
Journal of Information and Data Management (JDIM) Journal 2
TABLE I
LIST OF JOURNALS AND CONFERENCES WITH MORE THAN ONE PUBLICATION.
various types of context that can be taken into consideration
when searching for such anomalies, such as, the business pro-
cess model itself, resources, temporal information, data along
with its sources, and so on. An easy example for a contextual
anomaly could be found when analyzing yearly temperature
curves that are recorded from, e.g., a crop management busi-
ness process. While a negative outside temperature would be
anomalous in July, the same temperature would – most likely –
not be anomalous in December (at least for a middle European
climate, i.e., the location would be another contextual aspect
that could be taken into consideration).
Collective anomalies: Identifying collective anomalies re-
quires to correlate multiple data instances, cf. [9]. This is
because a collective anomaly only occurs if a collection of
data instances is anomalous while each individual data instance
is not. This can, for example, be mapped on a collection
of business process instances. While each individual business
process instance might seems to be unsuspicious all instances
combined could still achieve a malicious goal and should
be, therefore, identified as anomalous. This anomaly type is
substantially harder to identify than the previously described
two, i.e., it could be exploited by attackers to hide their
intentions. Hence, in the following we will especially check if
existing approaches support not only point anomalies but also
contextual and collective anomalies.
2) Nature of the Data and Data Sources: The identified
anomaly detection work mainly analyzes process runtime
behavior. Luckily today’s Process Aware Information Systems
(PAIS) frequently include logging components that record
and store process executions and related aspects. Hereby,
not only the control flow perspective but also more complex
perspectives that hold resource or temporal aspects can be
fully recorded and, because of this, analyzed. In addition
standardized – but also extensible – logging formats, such
as, the Extensive Event Stream (XES) format are available
to share, store, collect, and transmit large collections of
recorded process behavior between multiple systems, cf. [14].
Nevertheless the recorded process data (i.e., each individual
process instance execution trace) is not labeled out of the box.
Here labeled means that available anomaly detection train-
ing data (i.e., recorded process instance traces) would be cor-
rectly denoted as normal or anomalous. Such data would be of
especial interest for process anomaly detection approaches to
extract the difference between both data categories to identify
anomalies in unseen process executions. Unfortunately a broad
application of labeled data is unlikely because the labeling
must typically be conducted by human experts – which re-
quires a substantial investment in time and money, cf. [9].
In addition process executions frequently cover a substantial
amount of flexibility. Hence, constructing a data set that covers
all possible normal and anomalous process execution behavior
characteristics is rather difficult. Dependent on the availability
of labeled data (i.e., labeled normal/anomalous behavior, only
labeled normal behavior, or completely unlabeled data) three
different anomaly detection concepts can be applied:
Supervised anomaly detection: Approaches that are apply-
ing a supervised mode have the highest labeling requirements
from all three approaches. They require that normal but also
anomalous process executions are correctly labeled. Hereby
the data can be exploited to constructs classification models
that can classify any unseen process behavior into the normal
or anomalous class. The applicability of such approaches is
limited as accurately labeled data is hardly available and
challenging to generate. Moreover, anomalous behavior is
frequently relatively rare, hence, an imbalanced distribution
between both data types can be observed. This further hardens
the application of supervised approaches but also paves the
way for semi- and unsupervised detection techniques.
Semi-Supervised anomaly detection: Related detection tech-
niques only assume that data that is labeled as normal is
available. This reduces the data preparation requirements and
simplifies the application of related techniques. For example,
as processes control critical and complex behavior, anomalies
could result in severe damages so that realistic anomalous
labeled data is either hard to model or so rare that it can
hardly be recorded. Hence, the recorded normal behavior is
exploited to construct a model (e.g., a reference process model)
that represents normal behavior. Unseen behavior that does not
comply to this model is identified as anomalous.
Unsupervised anomaly detection: Techniques that apply an
unsupervised approach do not require any labeling at all and
are, because of this, easily applicable in a wide range of areas.
A typical assumption of such approaches is that normal pro-
cess behavior is substantially more frequently occurring than
anomalous process behavior. Hence, the anomalous behavior
is infrequent/unlikely and can be identified by exploiting this
assumption. However, if this is not the case then the anomaly
detection performance drops significantly.
We found that the process anomaly detection domain mostly
focuses on unsupervised and semi-supervised approaches.
3) Challenges for Process Anomaly Detection: Before
starting with describing the different identified anomaly de-
tection approaches, we would like to point out challenges
which must be tackled by anomaly detection approaches in the
Fig. 3. Anomaly identification, points in time.
business process domain. We assume that this does not only
simplify it for the reader to assess the capabilities of existing
state of the art approaches but also it enables to recapitulate,
in the following, which challenges are – partly – sufficiently
addressed or still must be considered as future work.
Behavior Lifecycle Process behavior anomalies can be iden-
tified at three points in time. This is, the detection of
anomalies during design time (i.e., when process models
are created and their behavior is specified), real time
(i.e., during the runtime/execution of a process instance/
specified behavior), or ex post (i.e., after the execution
of a process instance/behavior has completed), cf. Fig. 3.
We assume that the detection of an anomaly becomes less
valuable for an organization the longer the timespan is
between the detection and the occurrence of the anomaly,
cf. [13]. Hence, detecting anomalies during design time
would be optimal. However, at this point in time all the
dynamic runtime behavior is not yet available (e.g., the
definite value of data variables utilized during a process
execution). Hence, we see real time anomaly detection as
the next best alternative. In comparison the application of
ex post anomaly detection can, likely, only identify that an
anomaly has occurred but not prevent it as the anomalous
business process instance has already completed and the
anomalous behavior was fully executed.
Change Business processes are executed in a dynamic ever
changing environment. Hence, to meet a range of re-
quirements that origin from this changing environment
processes are frequently adapted [15], [16]. In addition
the flexibility provided by processes is exploited in day
to day work life to react on individual cases which are not
sufficiently supported by the existing process definitions
[15]. Change and the flexibility provided by today’s PAIS
is diametrical to the requirements of anomaly detection
approaches. This is because a stable and repetitive behav-
ior simplifies the definition of normal behavior models
and the identification of anomalous deviations.
Interoperability Business processes are applied in complex
inter-organizational and inner-organizational scenarios
[17]. In such scenarios they enable the interoperability
between different systems and services with different data
formats and protocols. Hence, process focused anomaly
detection approaches must cope with a mixture of various
runtime execution scenarios, process behavior, and data.
To support this flexibility process anomaly detection work
should not focus only on single selected protocols or
systems – as existing anomaly detection work from other
domains frequently does, cf. [9]. In addition, the available
behavior data can change significantly between different
PAIS. So process anomaly detection approaches are in
need to support this flexibility by providing methods to
take varying and fluctuating behavior data into account.
Criticality/Communication Business processes tend to be
executed in an automatic high pace fashion, cf. [18].
Hence, when deploying an anomaly detection technique
in a real world scenarios it must not only provide a
sufficient computational performance but also, and likely
even more important, a sufficient anomaly detection per-
formance. This is, because automatic anomaly counter
measures, such as halting or terminating process instances
which were identified as anomalous, can have a sig-
nificant negative impact on an organization’s success.
Imagine, for example, that non-anomalous business pro-
cess instances are incorrectly identified as anomalous
and, because of this, automatically terminated. Likely,
this could hinder an organizations cooperation with its
partners and the handling of customer interactions.
Hence, anomalies not only need to be identified but
also assessed (e.g., harm assessment) and communicated.
For this, for example, root cause analysis needs to be
conducted to give security experts but also automatic
countermeasures the necessary information to correctly
decide if and how to deal with a detected anomaly.
Alternative methods, such as, only alarming a security
team that “something bad has happened” could result in
a flooding of such teams with incorrect alarms – which
could significantly reduce the trust in such a system.
Parallelism Business processes are executed in a highly
parallel fashion. Hence, the same process definition is
frequently executed simultaneously multiple times based
on multiple process instances, cf. [19]. However also
different business process definitions are likely executed
simultaneously. This could be exploited by attackers to
hide attacks. For example, an attacker could combine
multiple business processes whereby each one executes
only a limited portion of a larger attack. Hereby, each
instance for its own could seem to be inconspicuous.
Hence, when only considering each business process
instance individually such an attack scenario would, most
likely, not be identified. Identifying such attacks would,
inter alia, require to support the detection of collective
anomalies (i.e., the correlation of multiple business pro-
cess instance executions is required).
Perspectives Business process anomaly detection approaches
are in need to incorporate a wide range of different
aspects into their analysis methods. This is because the
behavior that must be analyzed spawns over multiple
process perspectives (e.g., the control, organizational,
resource, or temporal perspective). In addition process
executions create, manipulate, and transformed data dur-
ing their execution. Hence, process anomaly detection ap-
proaches must be defined in a flexible and extensible way
to support various forms of runtime/execution behavior.
When analyzing the listed challenges and domain character-
istics it becomes evident that process anomaly detection takes
place in critical, flexible, and highly parallel scenarios and
has to take a plethora of different perspectives, data formats,
and protocols into account. The following sections are used to
analyze how and if state of the art process anomaly detection
approaches are coping with this situation.
IV. BUSINESS PROCESS RUNTIME BEHAVIOR ANOMALY
DETECTION APPROACHES
All identified anomaly detection approaches are presented
and discussed in the following. For this the publications are
structured/classified based on their foundational anomaly de-
tection technology. Moreover, each approach and foundational
technology is briefly described along with its advantages and
disadvantages (including, e.g., the anomaly types the identified
approach focuses on). This enables to identify gaps and open
challenges and provides an overview on the process runtime
anomaly detection state of the art publications.
A. Classification based techniques
Classification based techniques typically generate/learn a
classifier (e.g., a reference process model) based on given
logged process execution behavior. Hereby, given process
behavior is utilized as labeled – normal – training data.
Hence, a common assumption of these approaches is that
the classifier generation data does not contain anomalies. By
comparing executions to the generated classifier they can be
classified as normal or anomalous (e.g., an anomaly could
be process behavior that cannot be mapped on a generated
reference process based classifier). Hence, classification based
techniques are applied under the assumption that a classifier
can be learned from given behavior that enables to distinguish
normal and anomalous process executions. In the following
we discuss a number of techniques that are applied to generate
classifier for business process anomaly detection purposes.
1) Process Mining based: Process mining was found to be
a common classifier generation approach. The typical process
mining focused anomaly detection approach operates in two
steps. First, one of many available process mining algorithms
is applied (e.g., the mining approach presented in [20]) to gen-
erate a reference process model that normal process behavior
should conform to (i.e., training phase). Secondly, during the
testing phase process behavior is compared with the just gen-
erated reference model, i.e., by mapping the behavior on the
model. Several variants of this approach have been proposed
which, for example, generate a model from a different amount
of traces (e.g., the most frequent traces or 50% of all traces,
cf. [2], [3], [21]) while assuming that normal behavior can be
mapped to the generated model one by one, cf. [22]–[25], or
with a minimal amount of model modifications (i.e., normal
behavior should show structural and behavioral similarity to
the classifier model, cf. [7]). Similar approaches are proposed
in [26]–[28] where the authors identify frequent traces, create
a model from these traces, and calculate the conformance of
infrequent traces to this model to identify outliers/anomalies.
Especially [29] is interesting in this area. This is because this
work couples [28] with a map reduce based approach to enable
a parallelized analysis of large process logs.
Another rather unique approach is proposed in [30]. This
work mines an automate that represents all behavior and subse-
quently removes/cleans infrequent behavior from it. Behavior
that can no longer be mapped on the automate after cleanup is
identified as anomalous. This approach can be computational
intense because it identifies an “optimal” way to clean up the
automate in multiple iterations. The work in [31] proposes a
window based approach that slides over the process behavior
and calculates an anomaly score for each window based on its
exact reproducibility frequency in all the logged behavior.
We found that the main advantage of process mining based
approaches is their deep rooting in the process domain. Hence,
they support a wide range of process characteristics and are
specifically crafted to deal with related challenges and data
(e.g., logged execution behavior with varying data quality). In
addition if was found that existing process mining approaches
especially focus on the control flow perspective. This also
affects the listed anomaly detection work, i.e., non control
flow related process perspectives are currently not observed for
anomalies by these approaches – which limits their anomaly
detection capabilities. In addition the listed approaches only
support point anomaly detection. We assume this as a fre-
quently occurring substantial limitation which was not only
observed for these work but also for most of the anomaly
detection work discussed in the following.
2) Rule Mining based: Rule based anomaly detection tech-
niques strive to learn and identify rules that represent normal
process execution behavior. Unseen behavior can subsequently
be compared to these rules and if the rules are not matching
then the behavior is considered as anomalous. In addition
reversed approaches are also conceivable. Hence, known
anomalous behavior is utilized to construct rules that match
only to anomalous but not to non-anomalous process behavior.
Comparable to process mining, rule mining also applies
a two pronged approach. Hence, first, existing rule mining
techniques, such as, association rule mining or decision trees
are applied. Subsequently, classic anomaly detection work typ-
ically assigns an anomaly score to each rule (e.g., to determine
how important a rule is, i.e., not all rules must match). Most
process anomaly detection approaches were found to apply a
stricter approach so that even minimal violations to the applied
rules classify business process behavior as anomalous.
Several techniques have been proposed for process anomaly
detection rule mining. For example, Support Vector Machine
techniques are applied in [32] to mine rules which must be
strictly met by a processes to not be considered as anomalous.
A different approach is applied by the work in [33]–[35].
These work focuses more on detecting rules which, when
met, identify anomalous behavior. For this, explorative process
mining is applied by experts to generate a labeled training set.
The approach in [35] includes ontologies to gain additional
knowledge about the processes under analysis.
The main advantage of the proposed rule mining approaches
is that they generate a, probably small, set of rules that
likely enables to differentiate anomalous from non-anomalous
process behavior. However, the strictness enforced by the
identified approaches likely increases the change for incorrect
analysis results in the case of flexible or evolving process
definitions. Moreover, a substantial part of the identified rule
based approaches is heavily dependent on manual interven-
tions and expert knowledge. Hence, experts must mark whole
execution traces as normal or anomalous (i.e., to generate
labeled training data) and review generated rules/combination
of rules to achieve a good anomaly detection performance.
Some of identified rule mining approaches, e.g., the work
in [33], were found to support contextual and point anomalies
along with multiple perspectives. However, the given support
for perspectives other than the control flow left the impres-
sion of being overly simplistic (e.g., temporal aspects were
supported but only by a manually generated global rule that
each activity duration must not exceed 15 minutes).
3) Clustering based: Clustering based techniques, such as,
nearest neighbor, were found to be the most commonly used
process anomaly detection work. These work assumes that
normal process behavior “occurs” in dense neighborhoods.
Hence, while normal process executions will be packed close
to each other anomalous ones will be far from their closest
neighbors or build an independent suspiciously small cluster.
This requires to measure the distance or similarity between
multiple process executions. For this [36] converts the behavior
of resources into vectors to measure the distance between these
vectors. Hereby, the grounding assumption is that resources
that are assigned to the same roles should behave similar.
Similarly [37] focuses on temporal aspects, i.e., it is assumed
that the same activity behaves similar in all executions with
regard to their temporal aspects (e.g., its execution time).
Finally, [38] focuses specifically on the control flow. For this
patterns are mined and utilized to cluster process instances
(e.g., based on the supported control flow patterns).
More control flow focused techniques are presented in the
following. Hereby, basically, the distance between an expected
and an observed activity sequence is calculated (e.g., based
on longest common subsequence mining). If this distance
becomes, for example, to high (i.e., higher than a manually
defined threshold) then an anomaly was found [39]–[43]. A
different technique is proposed in [44], which utilizes a limited
set of patterns whose likelihood is calculated. This enables
to briefly communicate why an anomaly was detected, e.g.,
because specific patterns were missing or occurred to early/
were delayed. Unfortunately, the patterns must be manually
created which requires a substantial amount of domain and
expert knowledge along with up-to-date documentation.
Finally, [13] proposes an unsupervised clustering/likelihood
based approach. Hence, a reference model is generated that
enables to calculate the likelihood of process executions. If
an unseen process instance is unlikely, compared to other
executions of the same process, then the instance is assumed
as anomalous. Especially [13] sicks out compared to the other
work because it implements an extensible approach that has
shown how the control, resource, and temporal perspective can
be supported at once.
Some of the presented clustering based techniques were
found to incorporate contextual attributes. For example, [37]
analyzes activity durations with respect to an artificial assumed
resource experience, i.e., [37] assumes that, e.g., advanced
clerks process requests faster. Herby the detection quality can
be improved and non control flow related aspects are taken into
consideration. Still these techniques frequently only focus on
point anomalies, e.g., single activity durations are analyzed
(except [13] which is also capable of detecting collective
anomalies). This could be exploited by inside attackers that
do not rush through the processes but instead show a normal
execution performance. In addition the similarity and distance
calculation can be computational intense, for example, the
pattern detection in [38] can be generalized to sub sequence
mining which is assumed as NP hard.
4) Neural Network based: Neural network based tech-
niques support a wide range of application areas. For this
a neural network is typically trained to differentiate between
normal and anomalous process executions. However, the iden-
tified work in [45] applies a different approach. The authors
decided to train the network so that it can reproduce the input
trace that should be analyzed. If the input and the reproduced
trace are not similar enough (again using a manually defined
threshold) then an anomaly was found. The applied network
has a fixed input layer size. Hence, traces could be too large to
be handled by the network which, in the case of, e.g., loops,
could be exploited to render this approach inapplicable which,
e.g., enables to hide attacks. In addition this approach only
focuses on point anomalies and the control flow perspective.
5) Support Vector Machines based: Another classification
approach are Support Vector Machines (SVM). Typically
anomaly detection approaches apply SVM to partition the data
space into regions that contain the analyzed data instances. If
an unseen data instance (i.e., process behavior) does not fall
in one of the predefined regions then an anomaly was found.
In comparison [8] uses the regression calculation capabilities
of SVM to calculate the most likely destination airport for
a plane based on position, elevation, speed, and so on –
these information is collected by monitoring processes. Overall
[8] focuses less on process anomalies than the other work
presented here. Nevertheless it is an interesting extension
of this field because it analyzes data variables collected by
business processes executions – which is rarely the case in
the identified process anomaly detection work.
6) Regular Expression based: Regular expression based
techniques define classifiers as regular expressions. Hence,
training data is analyzed to learn a regular expression that
matches this data. Data that does not match to this regular ex-
pression is, accordingly, assumed as anomalous. The approach
presented in [46] applies this concept to reason about data that
is exchanged during process model executions (e.g., between
activities or process partners). In addition this work proposes
to support contextual anomalies based on generating different
regular expressions for different contexts (e.g., resources or
processes that the data to analyze originates from). While this
provides a flexible way to analyze data it can be computational
intense to calculate and evaluate the regular expressions. In
addition if normal data is fluctuating (e.g., the data can be
defined in different orders without changing its meaning)
then this flexibility can hardly be covered by “static” regular
expressions without resulting in overly complex expressions.
B. Statistics based techniques
Statistical anomaly detection techniques typically generate
a stochastic model that represents analyzed behavior. If unseen
behavior is mapped on the low probability region of this
stochastic model then an anomaly was found. For this a
statistical model is fitted (i.e., trained) to the given normal
data. Such an approach is applied in [47] to detect temporal
anomalies (i.e., unexpected durations of activities as point
anomalies). Statistical approaches are heavily dependent on
a fine tuned and correct assumption of the data distribution
used to generate the stochastic model. Getting this right might
be simple for a limited set of dimensions but gets substantially
harder for multi dimensional data (i.e., if multiple process
perspectives should be incorporated).
C. Other approaches
The previous sections concentrate on process behavior anal-
ysis approaches that are capable of detecting anomalous be-
havior in an automatic fashion. However, different approaches
are also conceivable. For example, [8] proposes multiple
behavior visualization techniques to ease the visual inspection
and anomaly detection of process execution behavior for
experts. Coupling this approach with previously discussed
techniques could potentially simplify the root course analysis
of an automatically detected anomaly. Other approaches, such
as the ones presented in [48], [49] focus more on the behavior
definition side (i.e., process design time). Hence, they enable
– based on predefined patterns – to detect anomalies, for
example, in the data flow perspective of a process model (e.g.,
when data is read without being written before).
Overall it can be concluded that the process anomaly detec-
tion domain heavily focuses on classification based techniques,
in general, and process mining, in particular. When comparing
this to the overall state of the anomaly detection domain (e.g.,
including network security or hardware maintenance focused
anomaly detection, cf. [9]) then this picture seems to be un-
balanced as, e.g., statistical approaches are underrepresented.
Hence, it would be a promising research direction to explore
the applicability of those approaches in the process anomaly
detection domain – which motivated the following section
where this and other gaps are discussed.
V. OPEN RESEARCH GAPS AND DIRECTIONS
This section exploits the findings of this systematic liter-
ature review to identify open research gaps in the process
runtime anomaly detection domain. For this, Fig. 4 depicts a
summarized overview on our findings. For example, it shows
the number of publications that concentrate on each anomaly
type, process perspective, or that apply a specific fundamental
technology. Moreover, it depicts if and with which data the
identified approaches were evaluated and if the identified work
is focusing on design time, real time, or ex post anomaly
detection. If possible a publication was counted multiple
times (e.g., if a publication covers point but also contextual
anomalies or applies real world and synthetic evaluation data).
a) Detecting anomalies early: Today’s process runtime
anomaly detection approaches were found to be frequently
focusing on ex post analysis, cf. Fig. 4. So, they require
that, for example, a process instance was fully executed and
completed before the related behavior can be analyzed for
anomalies. However, at this point in time fraudulent behavior
or a malicious intention was already fully executed/achieved.
Hence, more flexible anomaly detection approaches are re-
quired that can also analyze incomplete process executions
to detect anomalies early, i.e., before the executed of an
anomalous business process instance has completed.
b) Root cause analysis/Communication: We found that
the identified process behavior runtime anomaly detection
approaches typically operate in a black box mode. So, for
example, they either only present to the user which business
process executions were detected as anomalous or, the more
communicative techniques, also provide an anomaly score.
This score indicates how much detected anomalous behavior
deviated from the expected behavior. This is likely insufficient
to truly explain the nature and cause of an anomaly to an end-
user. However a detailed explanation, likely, is important to
a) truly assess the severeness of the anomaly by security ex-
perts; and b) pick an appropriate counter measure (e.g., halting
or terminating the process instance in question). Currently the
most promising approaches in this area are the identified rule
mining techniques. This is because those can output the rules
that motivated the normal or anomalous decision.
c) Looking beyond point anomalies: It was found that
most existing process anomaly detection work focuses on
rather simple anomaly types, i.e., point anomalies. In addi-
tion a very small amount of all found publications propose
approaches that take contextual aspects into account – these
approaches were found to mainly focus on the temporal and
resource perspective, cf. Fig. 4. Even publications that cover
more than one perspective mostly only bundle two of the
multiple available process perspectives in a rather “closed”
way that can, based on our impression, hardly be extended
to take additional perspectives into account (a majority of the
found work even only supports the control flow perspective).
This results in gaps and unmonitored areas which could be
exploited by attackers to hide their intentions. To address this
limitation approaches must be constructed that can incorporate
multiple perspectives at once and that can be dynamically
extended to take new perspectives and developments into
account. As a quick solution it could be tried to aggregate the
anomaly scores generated by multiple point anomaly detection
approaches. Nevertheless this still leaves collective anomalies
behind which are, based on our findings, currently hardly
covered by almost all process anomaly detection work.
Fig. 4. Quantitative overview, e.g., on applied techniques, supported anomaly types, and process perspectives.
d) Interoperability and Parallelism: Processes behav-
ior takes place in complex parallel, inter-, and inner-
organizational scenarios and environments. However, it was
found that only non-parallelized inner-organizational behavior
is taken into consideration by the existing process anomaly
detection work. Hence, neither did the identified publications
support the monitoring of multiple parallel process instances
(from the same or different models) nor inter-organizational
process execution behavior. Through this typical application
areas are not yet secured and attackers could, for example,
split up attacks in multiple process instances to hide them. We
assume this situation as a critical gap which must be addressed
to tackle related attack vectors that could be exploited, e.g.,
to hide attacks from existing anomaly detection approaches.
e) Handling change and flexibility: Most of the ana-
lyzed work were found to be likely struggling with flexible,
changing, and evolving business process definitions. Hence,
the listed approaches typically expect fixed and stable pro-
cess behavior whereby minimal deviations from, for example,
an expected path are already sufficient to conclude that an
anomaly has occurred. We assume that such approaches are
too strict because processes are evolving around the clock
to meet new requirements, cf. [15], [16]. In addition the
flexibility provided by today’s PAIS is well received and used
to deal with non-standard cases. However, these flexibility/
constant change is currently hardly supported which can result
in assessing correct behavior as anomalous. In addition it can
result in a frequent need to recalculate, for example, anomaly
detection classifiers – which can be computational intense –
because they cannot cope with the evolution of the underlying
business process models. This situation does not only affect
the runtime behavior that is analyzed for anomalies but also
the exploited data source, i.e., process execution logs. Hence,
robust approaches are necessary, but hardly available, to deal
with noise or partly anomalous process execution logs. For ex-
ample, incremental rule mining could be a promising starting
point to address this situation, but was not yet explored.
f) Unbalanced techniques: Finally, as already pointed
out previously, the techniques applied in the business process
anomaly detection domain were found to be unbalanced, cf.
Fig. 4. We assume that this unnecessarily neglects countless
research efforts and significant achievements in other domains.
These likely provide valuable results and starting points that
can be extended to be applicable to the process domain.
g) Evaluation quality: Overall we found that a signifi-
cant part of the analyzed work shows only a limited evaluation
quality, cf. Fig. 4. This is, that most work were found to either
contain no evaluation or that the evaluation was only con-
ducted with synthetic data (e.g., synthetic process execution
logs). Hence, we assume it as an important aspect to ensure,
e.g., the reproducibility of the proposed approaches under real
world conditions. This requires to encourage organizations
to publish real world business process behavior data, in an
optimal case even known anomalous process instances that
were identified by an organization’s security team.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF THIS REVIEW
This section discuss limitations and potential threats to
validity of this systematic literature review.
a) Excluded areas: This systematic review concen-
trates on discovering and analyzing process runtime behavior
anomaly detection publications. Through this non process
runtime anomaly detection focused approaches, such as the
briefly outlined approaches in Section IV-C, were not aimed
on, e.g., this area can be covered based on future work.
b) Limitation of the search: Due to the wide-spread
utilization of anomaly detection it became necessary to limit
the search (cf. Section II) to specific sections of the searched
publications (title, abstract, and keywords). In addition we
concentrated with this work on electronic literature databases
and do not conduct, by purpose, a manual search of selected
conference proceeding or journals. This is because during our
previous systematic literature reviews (e.g., our work in [50])
we found that a manual search hardly identified work which
was not also retrieved by the database based search. Moreover,
this work includes more than six different literature databases
and applies snowballing. Therefore, we are confident that we
cover the most important sources and publications.
c) Presented ideas and algorithms: This systematic re-
view elaborates the ideas, algorithms, and foundations of the
discovered publications. However, an extensive elaboration
would go beyond the scope of this study. Hence, we would
like to refer the interested reader to the cited literature.
VII. CONCLUSION
This systematic literature review provides a holistic view
on business process anomaly detection approaches that can be
applied to detect and prevent related security incidents. For
this 35 publications were examined and analyzed which also
enabled to identify gaps and limitations in this domain. Related
to our research questions we found that:
RQ1 The process anomaly detection domain applies an
anomaly definition which is also used in other domains.
For example, that an anomaly is some king of unlikely
behavior or infrequently occurring behavior. Hereby, the
most significant difference between the process behavior
anomaly detection domain and other anomaly detection
domains is that the first one operates on a specific type of
data (i.e., execution traces) and faces unique challenges
which we assume as rather unusual for other domains.
RQ2 Regarding the applied anomaly detection approaches we
found a mixed picture. This is, because the found business
process anomaly detection work applies an unbalanced
set of techniques and focuses heavily on a few specific
methods and approaches. We assume that this neglects
the potential of alternative anomaly detection approaches
which are already applied in other domains.
RQ3 This work was capable of identifying multiple challenges
which are not yet sufficiently tackled. Hereby, we antici-
pate limitations when dealing with flexible and evolving
process model definitions as the most important one. This
is, because it was found that processes are under the
constant pressure to change – this is also one of process’s
big advantages because they are typically capable to cope
with this pressure, cf. [16]. Not supporting this key advan-
tage with existing anomaly detection approaches, likely,
limits their applicability. Moreover, most of the identified
work focused solely on point anomalies leaving more
complex collective and contextual anomalies undetected.
This likely results in unprotected attack vectors which are
not covered by existing work.
In future work, we plan to address the identified limitations
to strengthen the business process domain by preventing
security incidents through comprehensive anomaly detection
approaches. Hence, anomaly detection approaches will be
proposed that enable to detect collective anomalies in the
process data flow, i.e., especially in the data exchanged be-
tween process activities and process partners – which seems
to be a mostly neglected area, at least based on our findings.
However, because malicious data can be the source of attacks
we assume it as necessary to also detect complex anomalies
in this area. Further, we plan to propose approaches to detect
attacks were the attackers did split their malicious intentions
into multiple process executions. Each individual one might
seems to be normal but all executions combined would then
achieve a malicious goal. This is hardly detectable by existing
approaches because of their strong – almost exclusively –
focus on point anomalies and individual process executions.
REFERENCES
[1] J.-y. Jung, W. Hur, S.-H. Kang, and H. Kim, “Business process chore-
ography for b2b collaboration,” IEEE Internet Computing, vol. 8, no. 1,
pp. 37–45, 2004.
[2] F. Bezerra and J. Wainer, “Anomaly detection algorithms in business
process logs,” in Enterprise Information Systems, 2008, pp. 11–18.
[3] ——, “Algorithms for anomaly detection of traces in logs of process
aware information systems,” Information Systems, vol. 38, no. 1, pp.
33–44, 2013.
[4] D. Chen, D. V. Panfilenko, M. R. Khabbazi, and D. Sonntag, “A model-
based approach to qualified process automation for anomaly detection
and treatment,” in Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation.
IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–8.
[5] A. Chaudhuri, “Internet of things data protection and privacy in the era
of the general data protection regulation,” Data Protection & Privacy,
vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 64–75, 2016.
[6] M. Leitner and S. Rinderle-Ma, “A systematic review on security in
process-aware information systems–constitution, challenges, and future
directions,” Information and Software Technology, vol. 56, no. 3, pp.
273–293, 2014.
[7] F. Bezerra, J. Wainer, and W. M. van der Aalst, “Anomaly detection
using process mining,” in Enterprise, Business-Process and Information
Systems Modeling. Springer, 2009, pp. 149–161.
[8] C. Cabanillas, C. Di Ciccio, J. Mendling, and A. Baumgrass, “Predictive
task monitoring for business processes,” in Business Process Manage-
ment. Springer, 2014, pp. 424–432.
[9] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection: A survey,”
ACM Computing Surveys, vol. 41, no. 3, p. 15, 2009.
[10] B. Kitchenham and S. Charters, “Guidelines for performing system-
atic literature reviews in software engineering,” Keele University and
Durham University, Tech. Rep. EBSE 2007-001, 2007.
[11] B. Kitchenham, “Procedures for performing systematic reviews,” Keele
University, Tech. Rep. TR/SE-0401, 2004.
[12] J. Han, J. Pei, and M. Kamber, Data mining: concepts and techniques.
Elsevier, 2011.
[13] K. Bo¨hmer and S. Rinderle-Ma, “Multi-perspective anomaly detection
in business process execution events,” in On the Move to Meaningful
Internet Systems. Springer, 2016, pp. 80–98.
[14] C. W. Gu¨nther and E. Verbeek, “Xes standard definition,” Fluxicon
Process Laboratories, vol. 13, p. 14, 2009.
[15] H. Schonenberg, R. Mans, N. Russell, N. Mulyar, and W. van der Aalst,
“Process flexibility: A survey of contemporary approaches,” in Advances
in Enterprise Engineering I. Springer, 2008, pp. 16–30.
[16] S. Rinderle, B. Weber, M. Reichert, and W. Wild, “Integrating process
learning and process evolution–a semantics based approach,” in Business
Process Management. Springer, 2005, pp. 252–267.
[17] W. M. Van Der Aalst and M. Weske, “to interorganizational workflows,”
Seminal Contributions to Information Systems Engineering: 25 Years of
CAiSE, p. 289, 2013.
[18] S. Euting, C. Janiesch, R. Fischer, S. Tai, and I. Weber, “Scalable
business process execution in the cloud,” in Cloud Engineering. IEEE,
2014, pp. 175–184.
[19] W. M. Van Der Aalst, A. H. Ter Hofstede, and M. Weske, “Business
process management: A survey,” in International conference on business
process management. Springer, 2003, pp. 1–12.
[20] L. Wen, W. M. van der Aalst, J. Wang, and J. Sun, “Mining process
models with non-free-choice constructs,” Data Mining and Knowledge
Discovery, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 145–180, 2007.
[21] F. Bezerra and J. Wainer, “Anomaly detection algorithms in logs of
process aware systems,” in Applied computing. ACM, 2008, pp. 951–
952.
[22] W. M. Van der Aalst and A. K. A. de Medeiros, “Process mining and
security: Detecting anomalous process executions and checking process
conformance,” Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science, vol.
121, pp. 3–21, 2005.
[23] R. Accorsi and T. Stocker, “On the exploitation of process mining for
security audits: the conformance checking case,” in Applied Computing.
ACM, 2012, pp. 1709–1716.
[24] H. Jalali and A. Baraani, “Genetic-based anomaly detection in logs of
process aware systems,” World Academy of Science, Engineering and
Technology, vol. 64, pp. 304–309, 2010.
[25] R. Rieke, M. Zhdanova, J. Repp, R. Giot, and C. Gaber, “Fraud detection
in mobile payments utilizing process behavior analysis,” in Availability,
Reliability and Security. IEEE, 2013, pp. 662–669.
[26] F. Bezerra and J. Wainer, “A dynamic threshold algorithm for anomaly
detection in logs of process aware systems,” Information and Data
Management, vol. 3, no. 3, p. 316, 2012.
[27] ——, “Fraud detection in process aware systems,” Business Process
Integration and Management, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 121–129, 2011.
[28] M. Wang, P. Hsu, and Y.-C. Chuang, “Mining workflow outlier with a
frequency-based algorithm,” Control and Automation, vol. 4, no. 2, pp.
1–22, 2011.
[29] S. Mardani, M. K. Akbari, and S. Sharifian, “Fraud detection in
process aware information systems using mapreduce,” in Information
and Knowledge Technology. IEEE, 2014, pp. 88–91.
[30] R. Conforti, M. La Rosa, and A. H. ter Hofstede, “Filtering out
infrequent behavior from business process event logs,” Knowledge and
Data Engineering, vol. 29, no. 2, pp. 300–314, 2016.
[31] N. Gupta, K. Anand, and A. Sureka, “Pariket: Mining business process
logs for root cause analysis of anomalous incidents,” in Databases in
Networked Information Systems. Springer, 2015, pp. 244–263.
[32] F. M. Maggi, A. J. Mooij, and W. M. van der Aalst, “Analyzing vessel
behavior using process mining,” in Situation Awareness with Systems of
Systems. Springer, 2013, pp. 133–148.
[33] R. Sarno, R. D. Dewandono, T. Ahmad, M. F. Naufal, and F. Sinaga,
“Hybrid association rule learning and process mining for fraud detec-
tion,” Computer Science, vol. 42, no. 2, pp. 59–72, 2015.
[34] F. Sinaga and R. Sarno, “Business process anomali detection using multi-
level class association rule learning,” Technology and Science, vol. 2,
no. 1, 2016.
[35] R. Sarno and F. P. Sinaga, “Business process anomaly detection using
ontology-based process modelling and multi-level class association rule
learning,” in Computer, Control, Informatics and its Applications. IEEE,
2015, pp. 12–17.
[36] T. Zhu, Y. Guo, J. Ma, and A. Ju, “Business process mining based insider
threat detection system,” in P2P, Parallel, Grid, Cloud and Internet
Computing. Springer, 2016, pp. 467–478.
[37] P.-Y. Hsu, Y.-C. Chuang, Y.-C. Lo, and S.-C. He, “Using contextualized
activity-level duration to discover irregular process instances in business
operations,” Information Sciences, vol. 391, pp. 80–98, 2016.
[38] F. Folino, G. Greco, A. Guzzo, and L. Pontieri, “Mining usage scenarios
in business processes: Outlier-aware discovery and run-time prediction,”
Data & Knowledge Engineering, vol. 70, no. 12, pp. 1005–1029, 2011.
[39] W. Eberle and L. Holder, “Applying graph-based anomaly detection
approaches to the discovery of insider threats,” in Intelligence and
Security Informatics. IEEE, 2009, pp. 206–208.
[40] W. Eberle, J. Graves, and L. Holder, “Insider threat detection using a
graph-based approach,” Applied Security Research, vol. 6, no. 1, pp.
32–81, 2010.
[41] B. Depaire, J. Swinnen, M. Jans, and K. Vanhoof, “A process deviation
analysis framework,” in Business Process Management. Springer, 2012,
pp. 701–706.
[42] A. Sureka, “Kernel based sequential data anomaly detection in business
process event logs,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.01168, 2015.
[43] C. Linn and D. Werth, “Sequential anomaly detection techniques in
business processes,” in Business Information Systems. Springer, 2016,
pp. 196–208.
[44] Z. Huang, W. Dong, L. Ji, L. Yin, and H. Duan, “On local anomaly
detection and analysis for clinical pathways,” Artificial intelligence in
medicine, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 167–177, 2015.
[45] T. Nolle, A. Seeliger, and M. Mu¨hlha¨user, “Unsupervised anomaly detec-
tion in noisy business process event logs using denoising autoencoders,”
in Discovery Science. Springer, 2016, pp. 442–456.
[46] K. Bo¨hmer and S. Rinderle-Ma, “Automatic signature generation for
anomaly detection in business process instance data,” in Business
Process Modeling, Development and Support. Springer, 2016, pp. 196–
211.
[47] A. Rogge-Solti and G. Kasneci, “Temporal anomaly detection in busi-
ness processes,” in Business Process Management. Springer, 2014, pp.
234–249.
[48] F.-J. Wang, T. Lu, and H.-J. Hsu, “Separation of concerns in analysis
of artifact anomalies within workflow models,” in Trustworthy Systems
and their Applications. IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–7.
[49] G.-W. Kim, J. H. Lee, and J. H. Son, “Classification and analyses of
business process anomalies,” in Communication Software and Networks.
IEEE, 2009, pp. 433–437.
[50] K. Bo¨hmer and S. Rinderle-Ma, “A systematic literature review on
process model testing: Approaches, challenges, and research directions,”
arXiv, 2015.
